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Abstract— A Human-In-The-Loop simulation was conducted 
in January of 2013 in the Airspace Operations Laboratory at 
NASA’s Ames Research Center.  The simulation airspace 
included two en route sectors feeding the northwest corner of 
Atlanta’s Terminal Radar Approach Control.  The focus of this 
paper is on how uncertainties in the study’s trajectory 
predictions impacted the controllers’ ability to perform their 
duties.  Of particular interest is how the controllers interacted 
with the delay information displayed in the meter list and data 
block while managing the arrival flows.  Due to wind forecasts 
with 30-knot over-predictions and 30-knot under-predictions, 
delay value computations included errors of similar magnitude, 
albeit in opposite directions.  However, when performing their 
duties in the presence of these errors, did the controllers issue 
clearances of similar magnitude, albeit in opposite directions? 
Keywords—Air Traffic Control, Human-in-the-Loop 
Simulation, Trajectory Prediction Uncertainty, Human-Automation 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The National Airspace System (NAS) forecasts continued 
growth in traffic demand [1], and under the plans for the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) aims to address one of the 
system’s constraining factors, the controller’s mental capacity, 
by increasing the use of automation aids [2, 3].  These tools 
depend on the predicted speed and path of an aircraft: its 
trajectory.  Trajectory prediction capabilities are therefore a 
fundamental part of future Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
systems, and will be used by NextGen automation tools to 
provide advisory aids.  The performance of such Decision 
Support Tools (DSTs), and ultimately their operational 
acceptance, is likely dependent on the accuracy of the 
underlying trajectory predictions.  However, trajectory 
predictions, by their very nature, are not perfect: they are 
informed guesses.   
With the predicted trajectory of an aircraft, NextGen’s 
advanced DSTs can provide an alert: either cautionary (such as 
highlighting a conflict) or informational (such as suggesting a 
speed to meet a schedule, or displaying the predicted delay at a 
metering point), if needed.  Uncertainties in trajectory 
predictions then, directly affect the DST’s ability to help the 
controller perform their task.  While it is possible that the 
controller could compensate for the errors in ‘bad automation,’ 
they can only do so to a limited extent.  More specifically, the 
controller’s efforts to compensate for the automation may 
reach a workload ceiling, at which point performance may 
worsen. 
A. Study of Trajectory Prediction Uncertainties 
A Human-In-The-Loop simulation was conducted in 
January of 2013 [4] in the Airspace Operations Laboratory 
(AOL) at NASA’s Ames Research Center [5].  The simulation 
airspace included two en route sectors (one high-altitude and 
one low-altitude) feeding the northwest meter-fix of Atlanta’s 
Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), depicted in 
Figure 1.  The test participants were responsible for delivering 
aircraft to the meter-fix within +/- 20 seconds of the scheduled 
time (information shown to them on their display in a meter list 
and in aircraft data blocks), and for providing standard 
separation services for all aircraft.  The environment also 
included over-flight and departure traffic, thereby increasing 
the complexity of the task of providing separation.  
The participants staffing the test sectors were retired air 
traffic controllers, none of whom were familiar with the test 
airspace, and had an average of 23.75 years of experience and 
had been retired for an average of 5.5 years.  Confederate 
controllers, also retired, staffed Radar-Associate (D-side) 
positions, one for each test sector, while student/general 
aviation pilots staffed the confederate pseudo-pilot positions.  
During a one-week study, two separate simulations were 
conducted simultaneously and in parallel, creating two 
‘worlds’.  Although the approach of two worlds required twice 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170011189 2019-08-31T01:31:46+00:00Z
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the number of positions described above, it doubled the amount 
of data collected in the same amount of time.   
 
Figure 1: Experimental sectors simulating an arrival flow 
into Atlanta. 
 
The time-frame of the operations simulated in this study 
was anchored in a notional ‘mid-term’ NextGen environment, 
where better surveillance data and advanced DSTs could be 
expected.  In performing their duties, the controllers had 
several automation aids available to them (see Figure 2).  
Meter lists contained arrival sequence and schedule 
information, while delay indications were also shown in the 
data block.  A conflict probe displayed information regarding 
detected conflicts in a conflict list as well as in the data block.  
Trial-planning tools were also available, allowing controllers to 
manually craft trajectory changes to solve local problems.  
Additionally, functions were available to the controllers that 
allowed them to request a solution from the automation for 
detected problems. 
 
 
Figure 2: Screenshots of mid-term operational tools. 
 
It is important to note that the delay information displayed 
in the meter list and data blocks was configured with a unique 
behavior that could be considered a tool in its own right.  Any 
amendments made by the controllers to an aircraft’s trajectory, 
either manually entered, or trial-plan-assisted, caused the 
ground system’s automation to immediately compute a new 
trajectory which incorporated the newly available information.  
For example, if the controller issued a speed clearance to an 
aircraft, when inputting the new speed as a system entry, the 
automation would then compute a new trajectory for the 
aircraft based on the new speed.  This had an immediate effect 
on the delay information displayed in the data block and meter 
list, which would immediately update to reflect the new 
trajectory prediction.   
Because all tools were trajectory-based, they were subject 
to the various simulated errors inherent in those trajectories, 
meaning that due to uncertainties in the trajectories provided, 
the tool information displayed to the controllers was imperfect.  
This highlights one of the simulation’s primary objectives: to 
examine at which point the automation tools would become 
unacceptable to the controllers and no longer support adequate 
system performance in terms of separation services or metering 
conformance. 
The simulation investigated how trajectory prediction 
uncertainties impacted the controller’s ability to provide 
standard separation services and deliver aircraft on time to the 
meter-fix.  This paper aims to understand the nature of the 
controllers’ response to different uncertainties simulated across 
similar conditions.  Of interest is how the participants’ form of 
compensating for prediction errors affected the clearances they 
issued, and the exploration of new analysis methods to gain 
further insight into controller behavior. 
B. Simulation of Trajectory Prediction Errors 
Uncertainties were introduced in the form of wind forecast 
errors and errors in aircraft performance assumptions (e.g., 
climb/descent rates).  A selection of different Rapid-Update 
Cycle (RUC) wind files created mismatches between 
environment and forecast wind fields.  Wind forecast errors 
either over-predicted or under-predicted a predominant tail 
wind by varying amounts.  A baseline condition with no wind 
errors was included, as well as ‘Realistic’ Root-Mean-Square 
(RMS) wind errors of 10 knots, meant to represent typical 
‘real-world’ forecast errors.  Other levels of wind error 
included ‘Moderate’ RMS errors of 20 knots, and ‘Large’ RMS 
errors of 30 knots.   
The simulation also investigated errors in the underlying 
aircraft performance models, which were implemented such 
that while the ground system’s assumptions about aircraft 
performance remained constant, the actual descent and climb 
performance of individual aircraft behaved according to 
modified ‘scale factors.’  The scale factors were designed to 
impact the distance normally needed by an aircraft to descend 
from one altitude constraint to the next, or to climb from one 
altitude constraint to the next.  The simulation examined a 
baseline condition with no aircraft performance errors, as well 
as two additional target levels of aircraft performance model 
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errors: ‘Realistic’ errors of approximately 5%, and ‘Large’ 
performance errors of approximately 25%.   
The simulation employed two primary scenarios (scenarios 
A and B), designed independently, but meant to be 
comparable.  Coupling the two scenarios with different 
combinations of forecast and environment (i.e., ‘truth’) winds 
allowed the simulation to not only examine different 
magnitudes of wind error, but also both directions of error bias.  
A positive bias (an over-prediction error) resulted when the 
forecast winds were stronger than the environment winds, 
whereas forecast winds that were weaker than environment 
winds resulted in a negative bias (an under-prediction error).  
Environment and forecast winds were paired in these two ways 
for each of the wind-forecast error conditions.   
During the simulation, traffic scenario A was mostly paired 
with positive-bias wind errors, whereas traffic scenario B was 
mostly paired with negative-bias wind errors.  The negative-
bias wind errors used during trials with scenario B had the 
effect of presenting the controllers with seemingly smaller 
initial delay values.  In contrast, the positive-bias wind errors 
used during trials with scenario A impacted the trajectory 
predictions such that the controllers saw seemingly larger 
initial delay values.  For an aircraft left untouched, the delay 
would gradually correct towards the actual delay (i.e., the delay 
expected using perfect wind forecast information) as it came 
closer to the meter-fix.  This is true in either scenario: that is, 
the seemingly smaller initial delay value in scenario B would 
gradually increase as the aircraft approached the meter-fix, and 
conversely, the seemingly larger initial delay value in 
scenario A would gradually decrease. 
II. COMPARISONS MADE 
The simulation results showed that scenario B was less 
challenging for the controllers than scenario A [4], [6].  Given 
the different wind-error biases associated with each scenario, 
the present investigation explores the relationship between the 
wind-error biases and the study’s findings.  To achieve this, 
runs 11 and 12 from the study are examined because they both 
simulated 30-knot forecast wind errors: run 11 did so with a 
positive wind-error bias, while run 12 did so with a negative 
wind-error bias.   
Central to the current analysis is the controller’s response to 
the trajectory prediction errors as a result of the wind-error 
bias.  While it is true that the entire set of instructions issued by 
the controller to an aircraft represents that response, this 
analysis distinguishes the first speed clearance from the 
remaining clearances, thereby isolating what the authors 
believe best represents the controller’s initial judgement of the 
response needed, from later corrective actions.  In this regard, 
although the assigned speed is informative, it comes from a 
limited range of flyable speeds.  Therefore, the current analyses 
consider the relative magnitude of the issued speed change 
(i.e., the difference between the aircraft’s current speed and the 
issued speed), and when examined for all aircraft over the 
course of a run, provide insight in how the controller’s 
judgement changed over time.  This approach embraces the 
natural learning controllers do as they issue clearances, observe 
their effect, and adjust accordingly for the next clearance.  
Exploring assigned speeds and speed-change magnitudes 
together allows for a multi-dimensional analysis of the 
controller’s behavior not possible with just one metric. 
The scenarios used in runs 11 and 12 were similar but not 
identical, yielding within-subject data that is not directly 
comparable and does not fit traditional statistical testing.  
Instead, an Interrupted Time-Series (ITS) analysis was used to 
detect any progressive changes over time for a given 
participant. 
III. RESULTS 
Primarily based on the work done by Huitema [7], the ITS 
used here is based on an A-B design and traditional linear 
regression.  Like linear regression, each data set has an 
appropriate model.  The available models for this analysis are 
listed in Figure 3 and will be referenced numerically (1-4). 
 
 
Figure 3: Models for an A-B design Interrupted Time-
Series Analysis (Huitema, 2011) 
 
 Model selection is based on, first, whether slope is a 
necessary variable to explain the data, and secondly, whether 
or not the errors are auto-regressive.  If slope is a necessary 
variable, models 1 and 3 are candidates, if not, than models 2 
and 4.  If the errors are auto-regressive, then models 3 and 4 
are the only choices because they contain the appropriate 
correction.  These constraints lead to the selection of the 
appropriate model, and Huitema [7] lays out the necessary 
steps for model selection.  This analysis uses models 1, 2, and 
3.  Besides slope, the primary variable of interest is level 
change.  This is the magnitude of change, or level, between the 
predicted first point in run 12, assuming no change from run 11 
(the baseline condition), and the actual first data point in run 
12.  This indicates the immediate effect of the treatment, in this 
case, the reversal of wind error, on behavior.  If no slope is 
required, level change alone explains the data.  However, the 
addition of slope (when possible) leads to further interpretation 
of the data.  
A. World 1, sector 5 
Table 1: World 1, Sector 5’s results. 
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W1S5 did not show a significant level change from runs 11 
to 12 in their raw speed event data β = -3.58, t(112) = .40, p 
=.69, SLC= .15, however the level change for speed-change 
magnitude was significantly different β = -1.04, t(114) = -5.57, 
p <.001, SLC= -1.04.  As seen in Figure 4, there was a 
significant slope in the baseline of speed events β = .47, t(112) 
= 2.63, p= .001, SLC= .15 and significant speed event slope 
level change β = -.58, t(112) = -2.15, p = 0.03, SLC= 0.15 from 
runs 11 to 12.  
 
Figure 4: World 1, Sector 5’s graphical display of the 
chronological data. 
 
 
B. World 2, sector 5 
Table 3: World 2, Sector 5’s results. 
Table 2: Statistical summary of the interrupted time series analysis. 
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W2S5 had a statistically significant level change for both 
speed event data β = 12.39, t(60) = 2.083, p =0.04, SLC= 0.53 
and speed-change magnitude β = -40.86, t(58) = -4.55, p <.001, 
SLC= -2.32, which can be seen in Figure 5.  Model 2 fully 
explained the speed event data, removing slope.  However, the 
speed-change magnitude data required model 1, and while 
there was no statistically significant slope in run 11, there was 
a statistically significant slope change from runs 11 to 12 β = 
1.46, t(58) = 2.77, p = 0.008, SLC= -2.32  
 
Figure 5: World 2, Sector 5’s graphical display of the 
chronological data. 
C. World 1, sector 6 
Table 4: World 1, Sector 6’s results. 
 
W1S6 used model 2 to explain both data sets, with level 
change the only variable of interest (see Figure 6).  For both 
speed events β = 47.89, t(55) = 9.37, p <.001, SLC= 2.60 and 
speed-change magnitude β = 36.91, t(55) = 5.27, p <.001, 
SLC= 1.44 there was a statistically significant level change 
between runs 11 and 12. 
 
 
Figure 6: World 1, Sector 6’s graphical display of the 
chronological data. 
D. World 2, sector 6 
Table 5: World 2, Sector 6’s results. 
 
W2S6 had the only instance of auto-regressive errors, and 
with the correction, both data sets used model 3.  Level change 
was statistically significant in speed event β = 34.09, t(59) = 
2.02, p =0.05, SLC= 1.87  but not speed-change magnitude β = 
1.29, t(59) = 0.01, p =0.92, SLC= 0.06.  Speed event data did 
not have a statistically significant baseline slope β = 0.8, t(59) 
= 1.13, p =0.26, SLC= 1.87 or slope change β = -1.35, t(59) = -
1.06, p =0.29, SLC= 1.87.  However, speed-change magnitude 
had both a statistically significant baseline slope β = 1.60, t(59) 
= 3.6, p <.001, SLC= 0.06 and slope change β = -1.63, t(59) = -
2.04, p =0.05, SLC= 0.06 (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: World 2, Sector 6’s graphical display of the 
chronological data. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Discussion of this data centers on the individual air traffic 
controllers’ responses to the change in wind forecast error.  
The primary goal was to investigate whether an interrupted 
time-series analysis would prove beneficial in understanding 
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air traffic controller behavior.  While this analysis does not 
lend to a direct comparison between air traffic controllers, 
examining the individual behavior does highlight potential 
trends.  Of the data presented, speed-change magnitude is 
possibly more interesting, as this highlights the controller’s 
clearances in relation to their previous decisions, allowing a 
visual assessment of their strategy as they adjusted their speed 
clearances over time.  Both data types together, the raw data 
(speed events), and speed-change magnitude, provide a more 
complete picture of the controller’s behavior.  The analyses 
presented here also provide the opportunities for discussion 
and refinement of its application to the air traffic control 
domain. 
The concept of level change, and whether or not their initial 
clearance after the interval was predictable based on their 
clearance strategy for run 11 (analogous to a previous shift), 
reveals if the controllers carried over their strategy despite the 
interval.  World 1, Sector 5’s (W1S5) level change provided 
insight into a controller’s response to the interval when both 
speed events and speed change magnitude are looked at in 
conjunction.  The fist clearance given by W1S5 after the 
interval fell in the predicted range (no level change), 
suggesting no change in strategy.  However, their change in 
magnitude from the previous aircraft was significantly different 
from predicted – notably changing from +11 to -9, instead of 
incrementing in a positive direction like the end of run 11, 
suggesting the controller reversed the direction of their 
strategy, a pattern that continued for multiple following 
clearances.  This behavior falls in line with the bias seen in the 
delay information displayed to the controllers:  the underlying 
trajectory predictions assumed the aircraft were traveling more 
quickly in run 11, and less quickly in run 12.  W1S5 adjusted 
their initial speed clearances downward as they explored the 
automation’s error and sector conditions.  W1S6, W2S5, and 
W2S6 all had significant level changes between runs 11 and 
12, suggesting that they adjusted their strategy post-interval.  
This could indicate a ‘reset’ of their expectations about tool 
accuracy when approaching a new condition.  Slope, which 
was not present in all cases, indicates a controller adjusting 
their clearances as they received more data.  W1S6 and W2S6 
both showed significant changes in their slope for speed-
change magnitude during run 12, potentially indicating they 
were adjusting their strategy throughout the run.  A visual 
assessment of the data shows that some controllers 
incremented their clearances, progressively increasing or 
decreasing as they learned, while some made more drastic 
choices. 
Additional visual inspection of the data begs further 
analysis of the variance between clearances, something outside 
of the bounds of the current analysis.  During the first 3 
clearances of run 11, W1S5 made large jumps, a pattern also 
observed in W1S6 and in W1S5 (though only for speed-change 
magnitude).  This seems to be similar to an archer gauging the 
distance to a target, where the first two arrows under and 
overshoot, with the third arrow reaching its destination.  
Another analogy could be that of the goldilocks principle – the 
bed is too long, too short, and then ‘just right’.  To some 
extent, the controllers maintained this pattern into run 12, after 
the interval, revealing more about the methods controllers use 
to gauge conditions in their sectors than about their use of a 
particular tool.  They may be running a goldilocks test on both 
the sector conditions and the behavior of their system’s 
automation.  Visual inspection, combined with the presence of 
some significant slope changes also suggest run 12 (the 
negative forecast bias), may have required more refinement by 
the controllers to hit the ‘just right’ initial speed clearance.  
Again, further analysis of the data’s variability will prove 
beneficial in this respect. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The interrupted time-series analysis (ITS), normally 
an experimental tool for the medical field, has potential to 
benefit the air traffic control research community.  ITS is 
proving capable of providing unique insight into the 
cooperation between humans and automation not available 
through standard methods (such as averages).  As noted in the 
discussion, level change and slope change, while useful, do not 
tell the full story.  Using an ITS analysis revealed that an 
additional analysis of the progressive behavior’s variance could 
gather actionable insight for tool design or training.  Additional 
thought should be given to an analysis of learning, and the 
impact this ITS perspective could have on a human-automation 
teaming. 
Nevertheless, the current analysis, if only by visual 
inspection, does lend credence to the conclusion that the 
controllers responded differently to the varying forecast 
conditions between the two runs.  The speed-change magnitude 
data especially highlights the slope and variability of the 
decision-making process as they assessed the wind bias 
post-interval.  This initial ITS analysis indicates the following:  
First, the controllers were responding differently between the 
two conditions to compensate for the forecast error, and with 
individual methods.  Secondly, controllers are likely to have 
strategies for assessing the conditions of their sector and the 
behavior of their system’s automation independent of the 
current state of the data.  Lastly, an ITS analysis provides a 
unique look into air traffic control data that opens new avenues 
for further analysis and thought.  
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